Wednesday, December 9, 2015

Submitted by Damon Coley


Gundlach Says the Fed Might Regret Raising Rates

Jeffrey Gundlach, whose $51.3 billion DoubleLine Total Return Bond Fund has outperformed 99 percent of peers over the past five years, said the Federal Reserve may come to regret raising U.S. interest rates amid signs of a fragile economy and a crumbling credit market.

The Fed is likely to find itself in a “conundrum” in a year or two if it raises rates amid economic trouble, Gundlach, chief executive officer of Los Angeles-based DoubleLine Capital, which manages about $80 billion, said during a webcast Tuesday. The central bankers appear “hell-bent” on lifting rates despite weak economic signals such as gross domestic product, he said.

“We’re looking at some real carnage in the junk-bond market,” Gundlach said. “This is a little bit disconcerting that we’re talking about raising interest rates with the credit markets in corporate credit absolutely tanking. They’re falling apart.”

Gundlach cited several danger signs in the U.S. economy that he argued make it a bad time to raise rates. Manufacturing has slowed as the dollar strengthened. Corporate profit margins have plateaued. High-yield bond spreads have widened and an exchange-traded fund of junk bonds had its lowest close today in more than six years.

“It’s possible the Fed pulls another Lucy and the football,” he said, referring to the “Peanuts” cartoon character who yanks the ball from would-be kicker Charlie Brown. If the Fed does act next week, a quarter-point increase is likely, according to Gundlach.

Fed Odds
Traders place an 80 percent probability that the Federal Reserve will raise rates next week for the first time since June 2006, according to data compiled by Bloomberg. U.S. bond yields are expected to climb as much as 1 percentage point by the end of 2016, with longer-term bond yields rising less rapidly, forecasts compiled by Bloomberg show.
Fed Chair Janet Yellen said last week that a rate increase this month was “a live option” because the U.S. economy is doing well. Employers added 211,000 jobs in November, more than forecast, the Labor Department reported on Dec. 4.
While other bond fund managers, such as Janus Capital Group Inc.’s Bill Gross, have urged the Fed to raise rates to reward savers and avoid asset bubbles, Gundlach has warned for months that the U.S. economy is still too fragile to withstand an increase.
He’s not the only one sounding alarms.
Meridee Moore, who is returning client money in her $1 billion hedge-fund firm Watershed Asset Management and converting it to a family office, cited the difficulty in finding good investments in distressed companies.

‘Grinding Declines’
“The last eighteen months have seen grinding declines in stressed and distressed credit and special situations equities,” she wrote in a letter to clients. “But even though market prices are lower, we have not been able to find new liquid credit investments with attractive returns and a margin of safety.”

Oaktree Capital Group LLC, the world’s biggest distressed-debt investor, has the most investment opportunities since Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. collapsed, according to co-Chairman Howard Marks.

“Post Lehman there was too much to do, and now there is again,” Marks said Tuesday, referring to the financial crisis that followed the collapse of the investment bank in September 2008. “For the credit investor we have our first opportunities in several years. It’s been a long, long time."
Gundlach, who has said he doesn’t want his Total Return fund to become too big to maneuver, said he’s “open minded” about a soft close to new money in the fund next year.
“What we’re interested in is performing,” Gundlach said. “We feel very comfortable with our ability to manage” the fund.



Monday, December 7, 2015

The Martingale

Submitted by Damon Coley

Written by Bill Gross - Janus Monthly Investment Outlook

Given an endless pool of “chips”, the theory is nearly mathematically certain to succeed, and in today’s global monetary system, central bankers are doing just that.

More breaking news – this time on the investment side: central banks are casinos. They print money as if they were manufacturing endless numbers of chips that they’ll never have to redeem. Actually a casino is an apt description for today’s global monetary policy. There is a well-known “foolproof” system in gambling circles that is sophisticatedly called the “Martingale”. I used to call it “double up to catch up” at my fraternity’s poker table where I was consistently frustrated (loser) – not because I used Martingale but because I wasn’t a good bluffer. Today’s central bankers use both tactics to their success – at least for now. They bluff or at least convince investors that they will keep interest rates low for extended periods of time and if that fails, they use Quantitative Easing with a Martingale flavor. Martingale theorizes that if you lose one bet, you just double the next one to get back to even, but if you lose that one you do it again and again until you win. Given an endless pool of “chips”, the theory is nearly mathematically certain to succeed, and in today’s global monetary system, central bankers are doing just that. Japan for years has doubled down on its QE and Mario Draghi’s statement of several years past, “Whatever it takes” – is a Martingale promise in disguise. It vows to get the Euroland economy back to “even” and inflation up to 2% by increasing QE and the collateral it buys until the Euro currency declines, the EZ economy improves, and inflation approaches target. Currently the ECB buys nearly 55 billion Euros a month, and this Thursday they will up the ante – Martingale or bust!
How long can this keep going on? Well, theoretically as long as there are financial assets (including stocks) to buy. Practically the limit is really the value of the central bank’s base currency. If investors lose faith in a reasonable range for a country’s currency, then inflation will quickly hit targets and then some. Venezuela, Argentina, and Zimbabwe are modern day examples. Germany’s Weimar Republic is a great historical one. Theoretically, if the whole developed global economy did this at the same relative pace and stopped at the right time, they could successfully reflate and produce a little bit of inflation and a little bit of growth and save the globe from the dreaded throes of deflation. That is what they are trying to do – Quantitative Easing, Martingale style – and so far, so good, I guess – although no rational observer would call these post Lehman efforts a success.

If investors lose faith in a reasonable range for a country’s currency, then inflation will quickly hit targets and then some.

That they haven’t really succeeded is a testament to what I and others have theorized for some time. Martingale QE’s and resultant artificially low interest rates carry distinctive white blood cells,not oxygenated red ones, as they wind their way through the economy’s corpus: they keep alive zombie corporations that are unproductive; they destroy business models such as insurance companies and pension funds because yields are too low to pay promised benefits; they turn savers into financial eunuchs, unable to reproduce and grow their retirement funds to maintain expected future lifestyles. More sophisticated economists such as Kenneth Rogoff and Carmen Reinhart label this “financial repression”. Euthanasia of the saver is the result if it continues too long.
But this is theorizing much like Schrödinger’s cat. How many people care about the existence of a quantum feline? (A few, thankfully, but not many.) Market observers say “show me the money” and when they look inside the box, they want to see some, so let’s get down to business.
How does all this play out? Timing is the key because as gamblers know there isn’t an endless stream of Martingale chips – even for central bankers acting in unison. One day the negative feedback loop on the real economy will halt the ascent of stock and bond prices and investors will look around like Wile E. Coyote wondering how far is down. But when? When does Martingale meet its inevitable fate? I really don’t know; I’m just certain it will. Doesn’t help you much, does it. Except to argue that much like time is relative to the speed of light, the faster and faster central bankers press the monetary button, the greater and greater the relative risk of owning financial assets. I would gradually de-risk portfolios as we move into 2016. Less credit risk, reduced equity exposure, placing more emphasis on the return of your money than a double digit return on your money. Even Martingale casinos eventually fail. They may not run out of chips but like Atlantic City, the gamblers eventually go home, and their doors close.



Friday, December 4, 2015

How Bull Markets End


Submitted by Damon Coley
Many people think that they ring a bell at the top of a bull market. Ding-a-ling-a-ling.
That is indeed often the case. The bell was rung in 2000 at the top of the dot-com bubble—I like to think it was 3Com spinning off Palm that broke its back.
But sometimes there is no bell, no catalyst, no story to tell. A bull market becomes a bear market, and it happens just like that.
Silicon Valley has been in a food fight for about three years now. Everyone knows it’s going to end, except for the folks in Silicon Valley. These guys are funny. I met a few of them in the last cycle. They really thought it was going to go on forever.
There are now 145 unicorn companies (private companies with a valuation of $1 billion or more), with a total combined valuation of $506 billion.
We are watching the top happen right before our eyes.

Square

If you were paying attention a couple of weeks ago, you might have read the news about a company called Square going public. Jack Dorsey is the CEO of Square. He is also the CEO of Twitter. I think of this sometimes whenever I complain that I’m too busy.
Square got a round of financing in 2014 at a $6 billion valuation, and now it’s a public company. If you pull up SQ on Yahoo! Finance, you will see that the market cap is $4 billion.
As Square was making the rounds in the roadshow, investors decided they didn’t want to overpay just to make the mezzanine round investors rich. So there wasn’t much demand for Square at a $6 billion market cap. It eventually went public at a $3 billion market cap, or $9/share. (The deal performed well in the aftermarket, at least. The stock is trading at $12.)
No catalyst. No bell ringing. The price simply got too high, and people pulled back. But you know what this means. If one deal can trade below private valuations, they can all trade below private valuations.
On to the next data point…

Fidelity

You may not know this, but Fidelity owns shares of private companies in some of its funds (like Contrafund). Fidelity has to figure out how to value these things.
In general, venture capital firms have to mark their investments to “market,” whatever that means. To do this, they use the services of third party valuation firms. Those valuation guesses are probably subject to mood or opinion, and as you can imagine, there are a lot of bad guesses. The valuations don’t mean much—if you’re an LP (limited partner), at the end of the day, you care about cash in and cash out. But mark-to-market creates some interesting short-term incentives.
As for Fidelity, they also have to mark things to market, and they also use valuation firms. But valuation firm A that Sequoia is using is different than valuation firm B that Fidelity is using. And Fidelity perhaps wants its valuation firm to be more conservative.
So Fidelity has been marking its private investments to market at levels that are below the most recent funding rounds. This puts the VCs in a bit of a pickle. Do they copy Fidelity or do they press on with their own, higher valuations in the face of dissenting opinions?
None of this makes people very bullish on startups.

Uber

Uber is the biggest unicorn of all, with a $50 billion valuation. Side note: they don’t make any money.
Uber is trying to raise another billion—at a $70 billion valuation.
Now, the only reason you would invest in Uber at a $70 billion valuation is if you thought they would go public at $80 billion or more. But looking at what happened to Square, that will almost definitely not happen.
And why would you pay $70 billion for Uber when Fidelity is going to mark it in your mush? Another great question.
I don’t think anyone is in the mood to pay $70 billion for Uber. Uber is stuck. They will have to go public or take a down round if they really need the cash.
And this, folks, is how bear markets start.

Brainstorming Session

So let’s do some brainstorming on what this could mean if it really were the end of the line for Silicon Valley (at least in the medium term).
  • Since tech has been going up while energy/mining has been going down, could this trend reverse?
     
  • Could value start to outperform growth? (If I’m not mistaken, it already is.)
     
  • Could large cap start to outperform small cap? (Boy, is it ever.)
     
  • If you lived in the Bay Area, would you want to sell your house and rent?
     
  • As new tech is in the process of topping, have you seen what old tech has been doing? Check out the chart of Microsoft, at 15-year highs:
For full disclosure, I started calling the top (or at least asking hard questions) on Silicon Valley about a year and a half ago. But I think most dedicated observers saw what happened with the Square IPO and said, “Yep, that might be the top.”
The other thing I’ve learned is that even when people recognize the top, they vastly underestimate how bad the pain is going to be on the downside. “Oh, it’ll just be a quick correction.” Never is.
One last riposte: Anyone who invested at these valuations will richly deserve what’s coming to them. Those prices were cuckoo.

Friday, October 7, 2011

Slovakia - Who New?

Speaking from his office, amply stocked with a humidor and wet bar, he added that if he were an investor in troubled European debt right now, “I, too, would feel bad about what we are doing.” (click to read)

The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Damon Coley, Nathan Aberson, and/or Aaron Aberson. Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson also act as advisors and clients advised by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Coley’s, Mr. Nathan Aberson’s, and Mr. Aaron Aberson’s recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the authors.

Wednesday, October 5, 2011

The State of Sovereign Debt

This is a good interview with Kyle Bass. The new Michael Lewis book "Boomerang" discusses Kyle and his unconventional knack for being able to look around corners and see what others can't. A glimpse into the future? Maybe.....(fast forward to the 2:20 mark for the interview to begin)




The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Damon Coley, Nathan Aberson, and/or Aaron Aberson. Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson also act as advisors and clients advised by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Coley’s, Mr. Nathan Aberson’s, and Mr. Aaron Aberson’s recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the authors.

And so it begins

Putin eyes new economic Soviet Union (click to read)

The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Damon Coley, Nathan Aberson, and/or Aaron Aberson. Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson also act as advisors and clients advised by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Coley’s, Mr. Nathan Aberson’s, and Mr. Aaron Aberson’s recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the authors.

Tuesday, September 6, 2011

Banks are not even worth the cash they have on the balance sheet



The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Damon Coley, Nathan Aberson, and/or Aaron Aberson. Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson also act as advisors and clients advised by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Coley’s, Mr. Nathan Aberson’s, and Mr. Aaron Aberson’s recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the authors.

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

Another Knock to Housing

I for one don't believe this is a very good time to dry up liquidity in the mortgage market. It fascinates me that this is actually being allowed to happen...(damon)


Wells Fargo Lowers Conforming Loan Limits (click to read)

The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Damon Coley, Nathan Aberson, and/or Aaron Aberson. Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson also act as advisors and clients advised by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Coley’s, Mr. Nathan Aberson’s, and Mr. Aaron Aberson’s recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the authors.

Thursday, June 30, 2011

Cooperman on the Markets & QE2

I've alway like listening to Leon Coopermans's interviews. His reasoning seems sound and he is (or so I'm told) an excellent money manager. Really good interview and worth a view....(damon)



The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Damon Coley, Nathan Aberson, and/or Aaron Aberson. Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson also act as advisors and clients advised by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Coley’s, Mr. Nathan Aberson’s, and Mr. Aaron Aberson’s recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the authors.

Thursday, June 2, 2011

Pimco's Gross Interview

In Simple Terms: Don't own Treasurys, Go Global, Own Stocks, or Let Bill Gross Manage your Fixed Income Allocation for You. Great Interview. Savers are getting a raw deal and are being forced to take riskier and riskier bets all in the name of earning a little return on their money. Enjoy (damon)




The content contained in this blog represents the opinions of Damon Coley, Nathan Aberson, and/or Aaron Aberson. Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson also act as advisors and clients advised by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson may hold either long or short positions in securities of various companies discussed in the blog based upon Mr. Coley’s, Mr. Nathan Aberson’s, and Mr. Aaron Aberson’s recommendations. This commentary in no way constitutes investment advice, and should never be relied on in making an investment decision, ever. Also, this blog is not a solicitation of business by Mr. Coley, Mr. Nathan Aberson, and Mr. Aaron Aberson: all inquiries will be ignored. The content herein is intended solely for the entertainment of the reader, and the authors.